Carnivals and Revolutions – Daniel Whistler on the Juxtaposition of Carnival and Politics

Posted 07 Dec 2011 — by Admin
Category Uncategorized

The Guardian art critic, Jonathan Jones,  recently turned his attention to the Occupy movement and specifically its public fact – the emblematic, Guy Fawkes mask. This mask of one of the one of the archetypal English protestors, mediated through popculture, has come to symbolise recent protest movements. Jones writes,

Occupy Wall Street Protester

‘The mask is surreal, self-mocking, funny. In fact it is truly carnivalesque… Carnivals can turn into revolutions… but they usually don’t. In fact, the real meaning of the mask is that modern protest is sophisticated, self-knowing, cunning. It does not necessarily show its true face – and it does not necessarily know or want too much. The world is being shaken by protests against the excesses of finance, but this is not a revolution – it is a carnival. This does not make it false, but wise. Real revolution is bloody and cruel and mad. A carnival is entertaining and opens up questions that cannot usually be asked. Guy Fawkes has become the kind of a carnival of questions. Far from being sinister, his mask is a jokey icon of festive citizenship.’

This juxtaposition of carnival and politics has recently become a staple of left-wing and communist political theory. However, where Jones maintains a neat divide between bloody and pernicious revolution on the one hand and the harmless ‘festive citizenship’ of carnival on the other, theorists have tended to blur the distinction between the two. An extreme example is provided in the manifesto volume, We are Everywhere, edited by the collective, Notes from Nowhere. They write,

‘A deeper imprint was left by the experience of carnival – halfway between party and protest, resisting at the same time as proposing, destroying at the same time as creating… The foundations of authority are shaken up and flipped around. The unpredictability of carnival with its total subservience to spontaneity… ruptures what we perceive to be reality. It creates a new world by subverting all stereotypes… It opens up an alternative social space of freedom where people can begin to really live again.’

Carnivals are here celebrated as one of the most effective means of bringing about contemporary revolution. The implicit claim seems to be: cavorting in a pink tutu is sufficient to effectuate the downfall of the capitalist system.

In recent weeks, a number of student and academics at the University of Liverpool have been attending a seminar hosted by the Department of Philosophy to discuss whether such a claim is quite as ridiculous as it sounds. The seminar was part of the School of the Arts’ own festival celebrating the 400th anniversary of Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale, which also included an evening of readings from the poet laureate, Carol Ann Duffy, and a three-day international conference.

At issue in the seminars was the question: is the recent penchant for the idea of the carnival a radical and innovative response to contemporary forms of oppression (whether bankers’ bonuses or police brutality) or merely a nostalgic glance back to a form of life that has not really existed since the Medieval period. For example, Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age looks back to the pre-modern carnival as a form of life now lost to us, where the secular time of the working week was suspended in the name of a spiritual fullness. On the other hand, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri see the carnival as only now coming into its own as a result of changes in how we work: the shift from industrial to communications-based labour has meant that trade union-led protest is made redundant. Instead, protestors (or, what Hardt and Negri call, ‘the multitude’) now organise themselves on the lines of a carnival – a spontaneous and open network of relationships.

Behind this recent interest in the carnival stands the great Russian scholar, Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin’s work on Dostoevsky and Rabelais in the 20s and 30s established the idea of a carnivalesque form of life. However, his legacy has been ambivalent. On the one hand, Bakhtin celebrates the carnival as the authentic mode of existence of the multitude when they break free of ecclesiastical and political power structures. The fun and laughter of carnival life liberates. On the other hand, Bakhtin (at least explicitly) laments, like Taylor, the passing of this existence. Critics have speculated, however, that Bakhtin may nonetheless be referring to the Russian Revolution with his idea of carnival: when the people protest, life becomes a carnival. Slavoj Žižek has recently suggested, though, that Stalin’s puges might be a more appropriate context: ‘Today you are on the Central Committeee, tomorrow…’. Once again, we come across the political ambivalence of the festival: it is almost impossible to decide whether it is either liberatory or reactionary.

Perhaps the last word should be given to Shakespeare who in Act 4, Scene 4 of The Winter’s Tale lingers over the carnival atmosphere of a sheep-shearing festival. Yet, rather than emerging out of free and spontaneous liberation, this festive spirit is orchestrated by Autolycus – taking advantage of the shepherd’s abandon to steal their purses. Carnival is here put to the end of making money; it is very much part of the capitalist system, not an alternative to it.

What would Jesus do? What would Kant say? Michael McGhee and Stephen Clark on the St Paul’s Occupation

Posted 03 Nov 2011 — by Admin
Category In the news, Uncategorized

Michael McGhee writes…

The media have looked on in delight at the discomfort of the Chapter of St Paul’s as it wavered in the face of the OccupyLSX Camp on its doorstep. As I write they have called off the legal action whose enforcement could well have brought about violent confrontation between protesters and police.  Conspicuous among the banners was the What Would Jesus Do? slogan. A banner reading "What would Jesus do?" flies outside St. Paul's Cathedral in London October 31, 2011. REUTERS/Suzanne Plunkett)It mocked the actions of those in the Chapter who wanted legal action and implied that Jesus would have been with the protesters. It was a shame the Cathedral Chapter wrung their hands about the loss of income from the tourist trade, but it was mean-spirited to compare them to the money-lenders in the Temple. What would Jesus do? Well from Isaiah in the Hebrew Bible to the Jesus of the New Testament we see passionate denunciations of the abuse of wealth and power, so we can guess where he would have stood on the issues. But what is that to us? In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant famously said that ‘we cannot do morality a worse service than by seeking to derive it from examples. Every example of it presented to me must first be judged by moral principles in order to decide whether it is fit to serve as an original example—that is, as a model’. The real question is, what would we do? Jesus is a model only if he exemplifies actions we have independent moral reasons for doing …

Dr Michael McGhee (Honorary Senior Fellow of the Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool)

mcghee@liv.ac.uk

Stephen Clark Responds…

Well, where to begin then? Maybe at the end: wasn’t Kant just wrong? Wrong about the way we learn what it’s good to do; wrong about the reason it’s good to do it; wrong even about what philosophers said before? Plato knew very well that we may be excited and moved by particular acts and persons before we have any idea what general principle or property they all exemplify, and even if we never can deliver an adequate definition: that is how Socrates operates, after all, in rebutting the definitions he extorts from his friends or victims – everyone can see at once that the definitions don’t fit the real examples. And even if I have an articulate principle of action (as it might be: help your friends and hurt your enemies) that may not survive a sudden revelation of what helping and hurting are. So exemplars do inspire real changes of behaviour, and especially when they excite our admiring love. So the rule for many post-Platonic philosophers was that – not being Socrates – they still wished to be like Socrates, and in ways that they couldn’t and needn’t articulate beforehand. Saints and heroes and even sages change the way we act, and even the way we hope to act, by showing us a better way, a life we hadn’t thought of. And just possibly their spirit may move in us in ways we don’t just imagine for ourselves: maybe they really change us, if we let them.

So imagining to ourselves what Jesus would require and do is not of itself an error. But of course, Blake may have been right to remark that ‘the vision of Christ that thou dost see is my vision’s greatest enemy’! The Christ of ‘the social gospel’, speaking for the poor and dispossessed, was not necessarily in favour of higher wages for an organized labour force! His line, more often, seems to have been that we shouldn’t be worried about tomorrow. Those who hoard their money won’t profit from their wealth, but it’s also, equally, wrong to demand equal pay for equal work! What mattered for him, as for most philosophers as the term was once understood, was to live in beauty, in obedience. Certainly he chased the money changers, and the animal traders, from the temple forecourt, but that was because they were out of place in what was built to be a house of prayer for all people.

And why shouldn’t the Dean and Chapter mind about the loss of income? St Paul’s is a thing of beauty, a source of inspiration for Londoners and others in far worse times than these, whether or not they are Christians – and someone has to pay for its upkeep. It’s not unreasonable to hope that those who love it will contribute what they can, and not unreasonable to worry about the motives and manners of a horde of campers!

Professor Stephen Clark (Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, University of Liverpool)

srlclark@liv.ac.uk

Michael McGhee Replies…

Hmm …‘the motives and manners of a horde of campers’ … they are certainly a nuisance, even Giles Fraser wanted them to go, but there are symbolic values in place here and it is one thing to wish them to go and another to invoke the law, as the Chapter later realised. I wonder whether one can ‘live in beauty’ and not act if surrounded by injustice … action against the oppression of the poor would be a form of ‘living in beauty’ … the least of these my little ones … especially if one perceives a causal and systemic relationship between one’s own standard of living and the conditions of the genuinely dispossessed in Africa and Asia and so on. It would be banal and sad if the ‘campers’ were simply exercised by envy and a demand for higher wages for the labour force, though the latter phrase conceals a muted multitude of sins and private tragedies. I recall Simone Weil’s observation that denying a young person an apprenticeship can amount to sacrilege. But what about Kant? I must say that I much prefer his aesthetics to his moral philosophy and Stephen writes eloquently here about how one can be changed by the great exemplars. On the other hand, it isn’t a matter of articulating moral principles and sensibility already consciously in place, but a matter of being awakened to them.  The admiration must depend upon recognition … otherwise one follows  the charismatic leader blindly and without thought … we need to  find some principle of distinction between those followers of Jesus who thought he was about to inaugurate the kingdom  and were ready for the blood bath, and those who looked inwards  because they realised what he was saying…

Stephen Clark responds…

Well, yes. There’s a remark of George Orwell too, that ‘we all live by robbing Asiatic coolies, and those of us who are “enlightened” all maintain that those coolies ought to be set free; but our standard of living, and hence our “enlightenment”, demands that the robbery shall continue’. So our great predecessors would have suggested that we could give up some at least of our luxuries if it would help the poor, and at least attempt to liberate our victims! It’s not even all that hard. As Paul of Tarsus wrote to the Corinthians to encourage their support of the relief fund for the famine in Palestine: ‘There is no question of relieving others at the cost of hardship to yourselves; it is a question of equality. At the moment your surplus meets their need, but one day your need may be met from their surplus’. But I haven’t heard that the Dean and Chapter ever disagreed with that – and clerics generally earn a lot less than the professional norm (let alone the norm for the financial classes). So they probably aren’t ‘the enemy’ (whom Jesus told us, by the way, to love).

On the motivation of the campers, I have of course nothing reliable to say – but that’s the point: neither had the Dean and Chapter, the Council, or any journalists. We know what some of them said, but experience and our own self-knowledge alike suggest that there are always other possibilities around. It’s not unreasonable to be nervous, even if we’re also told that true love casts out fear, nor necessarily wrong to begin to invoke the law: wouldn’t the Occupiers themselves wish to invoke the law – against financial and political corruption – if they could?  It’s also not unreasonable to wonder how exactly the Occupation will encourage repentance in the financial classes (supposing them to be guilty of the wrongs of which they are accused).

Of course you’re right that we can’t always be sure we’re imitating the right thing, even if we’ve picked the right exemplar. As Plato might have said, we imitate the shadow rather than the substance, as though what mattered (for example) was looking like a philosopher (which used to entail having a beard, and going barefoot). And plenty of people get the wrong message even when they are listening carefully to the words. Blake’s comment, by the way, continued: ‘Yours is the friend of all mankind; mine speaks in parables to the blind’! But is the right way forward to find a ‘principle’, a form of words, to guide us? I’m not sure even Aristotle, who played with the notion of the ‘practical syllogism’, really thought that: what mattered was awakening a proper insight into particular cases, and bending the rules (like a literal bendy ruler!) to fit around the edges. As he said (it’s in the Nicomachean Ethics), we can’t make detailed rules for every circumstance of human life, even though we do find general rules quite useful at the start.

It occurs to me as I write that the Kantian principle (but perhaps I’m being unfair to Kant) that we should do all and only what we can imagine everyone doing without some obvious disaster is entirely adverse to sanctity or heroism alike. ‘What if we all did that?’ is not always the most helpful question. But that is probably another story.

Does God Exist? Lane Craig vs (some of) the new atheists

Posted 17 Oct 2011 — by Admin
Category Events, In the news

Today (Monday 17th October 2011) Prof. William Lane Craig begins a widely publicized debating tour of the UK, arguing for the existence of God. Craig will visit LondonCambridgeBirminghamSouthamptonOxford, and Manchester, debating with atheists Stephen Law (after Polly Toynbee withdrew), Arif AhmedAndrew CopsonPeter MillicanPeter Atkins, and, if he changes his mind, Richard Dawkins.   The open invitation to Richard Dawkins to a debate in Oxford has probably been the main talking point: Dawkins was accused of cowardice for refusing to debate with Craig. Dawkins, for his part, famously responded to the question by saying that he didn’t debate creationists or professional debaters; this was a rather odd response given that Craig is neither a creationist nor a professional debater (his day job is as a professor of philosophy, although he has debated with most of the leading new atheists in the past (Daniel DennettA C GraylingSam HarrisChristopher Hitchens), and was described by Harris as ‘the one Christian apologist who seems to have put the fear of God into my fellow atheists’).

What philosophical arguments for the existence of God will Craig be deploying? Let us spend a moment or two looking philosophically at Craig’s favourite argument, the kalam cosmological argument, as outlined in his signature work, Reasonable Faith (p. 92):

  1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
  2. The universe began to exist.
  3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Craig regards the first premiss as ‘so intuitively obvious that … scarcely anyone could sincerely believe it to be false’ (p. 92), adding ‘Does anyone in his right mind really believe that, say, a raging tiger could suddenly come into existence, uncaused, out of nothing, in this room right now?’ (p. 93). What if the atheist responds that the first particle of matter just popped into existence without there being any reason or cause at all? Craig remarks that ‘any proof of the principle is likely to be less obvious than the principle himself’ (p. 92). The reader might like to judge for him or herself how plausible an escape route the atheist has here.

Craig judges that the main action will be around the second premiss, for which he provides in his book two philosophical sub-arguments (and some scientific ones too).

First sub-argument (p. 94)

Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite:

  1. An actually infinite number of things cannot exist.
  2. A beginningless series of events in time entails an actually infinite number of things.
  3. Therefore, a beginningless series of events in time cannot exist.

Second sub-argument (p. 98)

Argument based on the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition:

  1. The series of events in time is a collection formed by adding one member after another.
  2. A collection formed by adding one member after another cannot be actually infinite.
  3. Therefore, the series of events in time cannot be actually infinite.

Let us consider the first sub-argument. Someone might ask whether it is really true, as premiss 1 states, that an actually infinite number of things cannot exist. A mathematician might suggest, for example, that there actually exist infinitely many numbers. One thing Craig could do to avoid this would be to substitute a version of premiss 1 restricted to space and time:

1’. An actually infinite number of things cannot exist in space and time.

Our mathematician might reply at this point that there is an actually infinite number of points, and also of intervals, existing in our space-time continuum. Craig would probably respond to this by saying that these points and intervals do not really exist (andcould not really exist); they are just mathematicians’ abstractions. But a physicist might at this point join the conversation, objecting that the universe (or multiverse), for all we know, might be actually infinite, and might contain an actually infinite number of things. At this point the debate gets rather complicated: Craig says that the idea of an actual infinite leads to various paradoxes, while some sceptics respond that the scenarios envisaged by Craig merely illustrate the surprising nature of infinity. The reader might like to follow this up for him or herself.

Let us turn, then, to the second sub-argument. Someone might wonder whether it is really true, as premiss 2 of this sub-argument states, that a collection formed by adding one member after another cannot be actually infinite. What if, it might be objected, one member of the collection were added in one minute, and another member in half a minute, and each time after a member had been added, another member were added in half the time it took for its predecessor to be added? In that case, after two minutes the collection would be actually infinite, even if it started off empty. But Craig can reply that this is physically impossible, that there is a minimum length of time required for the happening of a physical event (though perhaps we cannot be sure that the laws of physics have always been such as to prevent this?). So let us turn to another possible counter-example that might be raised: suppose that time had no beginning and that on every day in the infinite past a new event happened – in that case we’d now have an actually infinite collection of events. In fact, there would always have been an actually infinite collection of events. Is this really possible? Again, the reader might like to read more of Craig’s response and the counter-objections to judge for him or herself.

Let us return, in conclusion, to the main argument itself. Somebody might object that even if it proves the existence of a cause of the Universe, it does not prove the existence of God. In reply, Craig suggests that the argument shows that the cause must be personal and ‘uncaused and changeless … immaterial … spaceless as well as timeless … enormously powerful, if not omnipotent … both free and unimaginably intelligent, if not omniscient … may have some special concern for us’ (p. 119). At this point it may be that the objector will press the objection, insisting that this is not enough to say that the cause is God, since God is usually thought of as also perfectly good or omnibenevolent, and that this argument of Craig’s may not succeed in establishing that. Once more, I encourage the reader to delve deeper into this objection and Craig’s reply.

It should by now be evident that Craig has developed a fascinating argument that raises a large number of rich and deep philosophical questions (even leaving aside the question of whether God exists). Further, we have looked at only one of Craig’s arguments – and he usually puts forward five. I encourage readers to go to one of his debates, listen to what he and his opponents have to say, and hear for themselves first-hand Craig’s answers to the objections discussed above. (Readers unable to get to the debates might like to browse Prof. Craig’s Web site, which provides an opportunity for the electronic submission of questions for him.) I’m looking forward to the debate over the next couple of weeks!

Daniel Hill

djhill@liv.ac.uk

Latest news from our friends at Philosophy in Pubs

Posted 06 Oct 2011 — by Admin
Category Events, PiPs

Liverpool’s Philosophy in Pubs group goes from strength to strength.  They held their first national conference in June this year, and are active in encouraging local philosophy discussion groups throughout the country (there are now 12 groups up and running in Merseyside and 26 around the country).

Aside from their regular weekly discussions, next week (October 10th-16th) is packed with events.  On Monday 10th October they will be facilitating a discussion for World Mental Health Day at The Haigh, JMU student union bar (1pm); on Tuesday 11th October, The Philosophy Cafe will be meeting in the upstairs bar/restaurant at The Bluecoat (1pm – 2.30); and the group is back at the Bluecoat on Thursday 13th (2.30pm) facilitating discussion for this year’s Chapter & Verse festival.  Finally, on Friday 14th, you can find them at the University of Liverpool’s Department of Philosophy presenting a special enquiry On Nothing (Seminar Room 1, 7 Abercromby Sq), with guest speaker, the philosopher/author Ronald Green talking about his book Nothing Matters, followed by an open discussion (1pm – 3pm).

Philosophy in Pubs meetings are open to all.  As they put it, “No academic or philosophical background is necessary, only a passion for enquiry. Just turn up and enjoy.”    For more details, see their website.

There is no ‘Grandfather Paradox’ – says Liverpool Philosopher, Philip Goff

Posted 05 Oct 2011 — by Admin
Category In the news

It was much reported in the media last week that scientists in Italy appear to have experimental results showing that certain subatomic particles can travel faster than light. These results are tremendously exciting because Einstein’s theory of special relativity holds not only that nothing can travel faster than light, but also that if something did it would move backwards in time.

Reporting on this development, the media dragged out the old ‘grandfather paradox’, familiar from popular discussion of time travel. The Guardian, for example, included the following in its coverage, ‘The paradox for time travellers is how their actions in the past will affect the future….what would happen if you travelled back in time and killed one of your ancestors, thus preventing your own birth?’

However, there is pretty broad agreement amongst academic philosophers that there simply is nothing paradoxical about the actions of a time traveller, or at least that the actions of a time traveller are no more paradoxical than the actions of a non-time traveller in a determined universe. This near orthodoxy (a rare thing in philosophy!) was set by David Lewis in his 1975 ironically titled paper ‘The paradoxes of time travel.’

Suppose as a matter of fact that your grandfather died in his bed in 1985. There is a clear sense in which you can’t go back in a time machine to 1950 and kill him. Not because that will somehow cancel out your existence, but simply because it would lead to a contradiction: it would be both the case that your grandfather died in 1985 and the case that your grandfather didn’t die in 1985. And the world doesn’t contain contradictions.

Now suppose that the universe is determined such that you won’t have a cup of tea with breakfast. Just as there is a sense in which you can’t kill your grandfather, so there is a sense in which you can’t you can’t have a cup of tea with breakfast.  In the former case we have an action that is inconsistent with the eternal facts of time; in the latter case we have an action that is inconsistent with the laws of nature.

But there is also, according to Lewis, a sense in which you can do both of these actions. Lewis thinks that the question ‘What am I able to do?’ is ambiguous. To take his vivid example, there is a sense in which I am able to speak Finnish: facts about my larynx and the sophistication of my brain entail that I am able to speak Finnish. But there is another sense in which I am not able to speak Finnish: the fact that I haven’t learnt Finnish means that you’d be unwise to hire me as a translator any time soon.

What one is able to do is always relative to some set of facts, and the broader the set of facts you consider, the less you are able to do. Relative to the fact that I have a kettle and tea bags and working limbs, I am able to have a cup of tea with breakfast. But relative to the fact that the laws of nature have determined that I won’t, I can’t. Similarly, relative to the fact that I have a working time machine, a double barrelled shot gun, and hell of a grudge about my brother getting the inheritance, I am able to go back to 1950 and kill granddad. But relative to the fact that granddad dies in 1985, I can’t. The freedom of a time traveller is no more limited than the freedom of a non time traveller in a determined universe.

Of course some time traveller stories do contain inconsistencies: the Back to the Future trilogy is full of them, e .g. Marty’s father spends his adult life being bullied by Biff, and doesn’t spend his adult life being bullied by Biff (because Marty ‘changes history’: an incoherent notion). But the point is that they needn’t, and when the writers are sufficiently careful, for example, in Terminator and the wonderfully complicated yet consistent Time Crimes, they don’t.

So you needn’t worry. If those particles in Italy are travelling faster than light, and we eventually build ourselves a Tardis, the world might suddenly become a lot weirder, but it wouldn’t become paradoxical.

Philip Goff

Philip.Goff@liverpool.ac.uk

POSTSCRIPT: Why does travelling faster than the speed of light imply time travel? 

Professor Barry Dainton (bdainton@liv.ac.uk) explains:

What is the connection between the speed of light and backward time travel?  Although a full understanding of the issue requires a thorough grounding in the physics, the basic idea can be grasped via a simple example.

Let’s suppose that our faster-than-light object is a clock.  At present, the clock is still a few million miles from the Earth, but it’s getting closer all the time.  You point your telescope in the direction of the clock and see that it reads ‘12.05’; a minute or two later you take another look at the clock and it reads ‘12.04’; a couple of minutes later it says ‘12.03’.  Your first thought might be ‘Ah, the clock’s mechanism must be broken, it’s running backward’.  But then you realize this isn’t the case. 

You know that the clock is travelling towards the Earth at a faster-than-light speed.  Suppose the clock did in fact display ‘12.04’ before it displayed ‘12.05’, just as any normal clock would.  You only see the clock showing these times because light has travelled from the clock to your eyes and equipment.  But since the clock is moving faster than light, after it flashes up ‘12.04’ it can (and does) overtake the ray of light which it emitted when showing ‘12.04’; by the time the display shows ‘12.05’ the clock is a good deal closer to Earth, and the light emitted reaches you before the light which shows the clock reading ‘12.04’.  So from your frame of reference – that of the Earth –  the clock is moving backwards in time; you see the later parts of the clock’s career before the earlier parts.  If the clock showed the news, rather than the time, it could reveal what has happened before it happens.

Festival gets off to a roaring start

Posted 12 Oct 2010 — by Admin
Category Events, Festival

Over 180 enthusiastic people packed into the Crypt Concert Room at Liverpool’s Metropolitan Cathedral for the first event of the Philosophy in the City festival. Philosophers of religion Clare Carlisle and Simon Oliver discussed ‘The Habit of Happiness’, and asnwered lots of questions afterwards. Many thanks to everyone for attending and helping to make it such a fantastic event.

Don’t forget, if you’re coming along to any of our events and plan to tweet about them (during or afterwards), please include the hashtag #pitc in your tweets, to make it easy for everyone to follow the conversation.


Philosophy in the City in The Guardian

Posted 08 Oct 2010 — by Admin
Category Festival

Clare Carlisle’s piece on the festival and its ambitions was published on The Guardian’s popular Comment is Free blog today. Asking whether philosophy is somehow a particularly urban pursuit, she goes on to explain the festival’s aims in taking philosophy out of the academic world and into city life. We’ve also been recommended in The Guardian Guide as a top event to visit, and have been featured on the BBC Merseyside breakfast show. Not that we’re bragging…

Forthcoming event: TOUCHED

Posted 13 Aug 2010 — by Admin
Category Events, University of Liverpool

A one day conference organised by the Philosophy Department, University of Liverpool and Liverpool Biennial 2010: TOUCHED on 19th November 2010, 9.30am-5.00pm at Victoria Galleries and Museum, Ashton Street, L69 3DR.

Speakers: Prof. Berys Gaut (St Andrews); Prof. Sue Golding, (Greenwich); Prof. Matthew Kieran (Leeds); Prof. Derek Matravers (Open University); Prof. Peter Osborne (Kingston); Dr Panayiota Vassilopoulou (Liverpool).

Sponsored by: The British Society of Aesthetics, The Mind Association, The Royal Institute of Philosophy, The Department of Philosophy and the School of Arts, University of Liverpool.

For more information contact Dr Yiota Vassilopoulou -  yiota@liverpool.ac.uk.

We’re on Twitter

Posted 08 Aug 2010 — by Admin
Category Festival

Philosophy in the City now has a Twitter feed, so you can keep up to date with all the latest news about the festival, and other events. Just go to www.twitter.com/philosophycity to follow us. Don’t forget you can also sign up to receive occasional emails from us about the festival and other forthcoming events. Just enter your details in the box on the right of the screen.